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1. Seme Aspects of the Theory of Charity Market Failure
Economists like to justify public redistributive activity with
standard externality arguments. While not denying the existence
of a private .charity market based on altruism, feelings of social
responsibility, pure taste for giving or even -egoistic speculation
on future rewards to charity, they seriously doubt the efficiency
of the "market cutcane. The prime reason for the presumed market
failure lies in a peculiar feature of the charity market, namely :
the inherent division of consumption into a "material" component
enjoyed by the donee and a "spiritual" component enjoyed by the
donor precisely by making somebody else better off. For other po-
tential donors this creates the chance for a free ride: as long
as their preferences for giving at least partially depend on the
well-being of the recipients - pure.private good cases are ex-
cluded -, they adjust far others' transfers to the poor by reducing
their own contributions to an "independent adjustment equilibrium
level" with marginal social utility greater than marginal cost of the
transfersi Thus the overall level of charitable giving will remain
below Samuelson's optimal public goods supply, and a case for
public redistribution in the broadest sense (including the pro-
vision of Welfare services) seems to be established. :
This string of reasoning which has found its most elegant analy-
2
tical shape in the work on the pareto optimal redistribution ,
correctly identifies the most compelling reason for a charity
market failure . Its policy conclusion, however, goes too far:
The author is grateful to Ludwig Gutberlet, Klaus-Werner Schatz
and Roland Vaubel for valuable canmehts on an earlier draft of
the paper. Thanks are also due to Rolf Knudsen who mastered the
computer work with a lot of patience and imagination.
This term is due to Buchanan (5), p. 11 ff.
2 - - • • •
See Hochman & Rpdgers (16), Furstenberg & Mueller (13) et.al.
Brennan (3) reveals another rationale for government intervention
based on positive externalities between donors and donees. Paque
(19.), in turn, doubts the validity of Brennan's argument.- 2 -
from a neoclassical viewpoint, the internalization of externali-
ties should always proceed by means of a policy which best pre-
serves the desirable qualities of a decentralized market system.
In this respect, a "socialization" of redistribution is inferior
to a policy of subsidizing private charitable giving to extend
the level of redistribution to the socially optimal - level where
the sum of all individual marginal utilities of the transfers
equals their marginal cost . Such' a policy preserves the indivi-
dual freedom of choice inherent in any market activity; in con-
trast the canpulsory public redistribution must resort to seme
complex public choice processes which frequently involve distinct
violations of the basic Pareto efficiency criterion.
Of course, a policy of subsidization has to face serious infor-
mation problems since both the amount and the incidence of the
consumption, externalities among different individuals are unknown.
A subsidy scheme will thus most likely remain suboptimal, but so
will a socialization of redistribution: as long as the state
honestly pursues the aim of achieving an optimal provision of a
public good he cannot escape the duty of somehow estimating the
amount and incidence of the externalities involved. The informa-
tional requirement with respect to external effects is the same
for both policies; hence no a priori argument in favour of socia-
2
lisation can be derived on informational efficiency grounds .
Other efficiency arguments clearly favour some subsidy scheme
over outright socialization. The deadweight loss of a govern-
mental bureaucracy may well be cut back if individuals prefer
to adress their charitable giving to competing private welfare
organisations with more efficient management and better knowledge
of peculiar market conditions. This in turn may reduce the moral
This assumption is implicitly made in all studies on the optimal
level and. structure of tax subsidies to charity (Atkinson (2) , .
Dean (8) , Brennan (4), Hochman & Rodgers (17)).
2
In fact the total informational requirement is larger for sociali-
zation as it requires estimates of the internal effects as well.- 3 -
hazard problems which tend to cumulate in highly centralized
anonymous redistribution systems . Finally the enlarged range of
individual choice may stimulate overall economic activity just
as particular tax or tariff cuts induce substitution and income
effects that are likely to be conducive to economic growth. This
gain in dynamic efficiency may be particularly important if an
income progressive subsidy scheme is adopted (e.g. tax deducta-
bility in an income progressive tax structure) since this allows
economic agents with growing income to avoid high marginal and
2
average tax rates .
Without further discussion of these theoretical aspects going
beyond the scope of this paper, it remains to be concluded that
there are a number of most plausible economic rationales for sub-
sidizing private charity instead of socializing redistribution.
German tax authorities have cautiously adopted this view in § 1Cfo
of the Income Tax Law which reads: "Private giving to the ad-
vancement of charitable as well as ecclesiastical, religious,
scientific and selected political purposes ... are deductible up
to a limit of 5 per cent of gross income" .
The main purpose of this paper is to test econcmetrically whether
the deductability rule of German tax law can be called efficient
in any meaningful economic sense. Section 2 of the paper develops
a formal concept of "quantitative efficiency" which appears to be
the appropriate framework for econometric modelling. Section 3
discusses sane problems concerning the computation of the main
variables and the estimation procedure. Section 4 presents the most
As Buchanan (6, pp. 364 ff.) puts it, decentralization through
competition reduces the divergence between "the extent of morals"
and the "extent of markets".
2
This is not to say that an income progressive scheme is preferable
to a flat-rate subsidy. Fran a static welfare viewpoint just the
reverse is most likely true (see Hochman & Rodgers (17, pp. 7 ff.),
Paque (19, pp. 22 ff.)).
See NWB-Textausgabe: Wichtige Steuergesetze, 27. Auflage, Berlin
1980, S. 35/36 (translation with minor changes: K.-H. P.).reliable empirical results of alternative model specifications;
these are compared to some estimates obtained by Feldstein in his
econometric work on taxation and charity in the U.S. Section 5
develops some scenarios for premising reform proposals based on
the previously derived econometric model. Section 6 concludes the
paper with sane final remarks on specific "German" problems of
studying the impact of tax subsidies to charity.
2. The Concept of "Quantitative Efficiency"
In a broad welfare theoretic sense, the concept of efficiency lies
far beyond any approach of empirical testing: it is simply not
possible to know to any reliable degree either the amount or the
incidence of all pareto relevant spill-over-effects due to bilate-
ral charity transfers.
In a less ambitious framework, however, we may well be able to
derive meaningful propositions about the state of efficiency of
the charity market. Assuming
- that the given level of redistribution is optimal in the broad
sense of externality internalization, and
- that private transfers are not inferior to an equal amount of
public redistribution,
an unambiguous quantitative efficiency gain can be secured by a
substitution of private giving for public expenditure at any given
(optimal) level of overall redistribution (public + private trans-
fers = const.!) if_ the cost (= tax spending) of subsidizing private
charity is lower than the cost of financing a corresponding public
expenditure program.
Of course, this concept of quantitative efficiency may be criti-
cized . on the basis of the realism of its assumptions.- 5 -
First, the level of actual redistribution is certainly not optimal
at any given point in time. A change of the level, however, should
not in any way. affect the efficiency of a substituion.between pub-
lic and private charity within a given amount of overall redistri-
bution. The optimality assumption thus.serves as an.auxiliary de-
vice to allow unambiguous welfare judgements about structural shifts
independent of moves towards or away from optimality in the level of
redistribution. The weaker assumption of a constant level of re-
distribution would do as well provided that potential pareto im-
provements through shifts in the transfer level are explicitly
excluded as parts of the welfare judganent.
Second, the private allocation of charity funds will most likely
differ frcm prior public redistributive pattern. Fran a neo-
classical viewpoint this allocative change may be welcome as a
genuine welfare gain due to a dismantling of distorted public
choice processes. Even if this staunch theoretical view is not taken,
there is good reason to believe that the state has ample opportunity
for reestablishing the prior overall redistributive pattern via
simple internal adjustment at lower levels of total social costs.
Despite the striking variety of potential charity recipients named
in § 10b of the German Incane Tax Law - including political parties -,
many recipients of private charity, are also somehow financially
supported by the state, frequently through budgetary items not
summed under the label of welfare expenditure ,. Furthermore the
actual level of private charitable giving - in 1974 around 660 Mio.
DM - still amounts to a tiny part of total public expenditure, and
it seems not at all unrealistic to assume that the "capacity limit"
for indirect substitution via internal adjustment has not yet been
reached. Hence private giving should be, at last in present day
Germany, a close to prefect and in no way inferior substitute for
public redistribution.
Backed up by reasonably realistic assumptions we are ready to de-
rive optimality conditions for quantitative efficiency: A pareto
Political parties may be a good case in point.— 6 —
improvement will be achieved by additional subsidies to private
charity if the induced increase in private giving (and hence the
induced reduction in public welfare expenditure) surpasses the
additional amount of public subsidies so that the state can secure
a (net) gain to be passed over to the citizens through reduced
overall tax rates at an unchanged level of transfers.
Standard microeconcmic monopoly theory is the appropriate tool to
formalize this idea (fig. 1):
AC
The state can vary the price p per unit of giving by varying the
subsidy fraction (1-p); just like a private monopolist he faces a
more or less downward sloping demand curve which allows him to
maximize social gain (G) defined as the difference between the sum
of private charitable giving (C) and the sum of public subsidies.
Hence: Max G!
G = C(p) - [i - p] C(p)
= p • C(p)
dG _ n ( . . „ dC(p) C(p) +p ^ +p
p
C(p) • pi • dpj
with M < 0 c
1 The formal analogy to the Amoroso-Robinson-Condition is obvious
(see H. Varian (20), p. 53 f.). -- 7 -




Again analoguous to private monopoly theory the optimal prioe/
quantity-mix depends on the prioa elasticity of demand for chari-
table giving.
- if If = -1, the subsidy per unit of giving (1-p) is just
sufficient to maximize social gain;
- if U < -1, there is a positive marginal gain of exploiting
the giving potential by raising the subsidy to some level above
(1-P);
- if If > -1, the subsidy should be lowered to exploit the in-
c 1
elasticity of the demand for giving .
Derived in a partial equilibrium framework these criteria neglect
income effects that may arise from decreasing/increasing subsidies
to private giving. As the ratio of private giving to gross income
is extremely low in the F.R.G. - on average around 0.2 % in 1974 -
the relevant income effects will be negligibly small except in
cases of dramatic subsidy changes.
The primary purpose of the following empirical inquiry must be the
estimation of price elasticities for the Federal Republic of Germany.
Depending on the magnitude of these elasticities proposals for reform
will be advanced. Methodologically the work canes close to prior
econometric studies done by Feldstein & associates (2, 8, 9, 10, 11)
For an ingenious interpretation of the price elasticity of demand
for charitable giving in terms of externalities between donors and
donees, see Brennan (4). A critical review of Brennan's argument
is given by Paque (19, pp. 11 ff.).- 8 -
and Clotfelter (6) for the U.S.
1,
3. The Econometric Model
The estimates are based on German income tax data for private giving
pursuant to § 10b income tax law, disaggregated by fourteen gross
2 income classes . These statistics tend to be published in three years
intervals; the series startes in 1961 and for the time being ends in
1974 . Hence it is possible to estimate the average level of chari-
table giving per gross income class as a function of the average dis-
posible inccme and the average "price of charity" in this claiss.
The various specification problems of this model will be described
briefly.
3.1. Private Charitable Giving (C)
The specification of C appears to be straightforward: it is defined
as the sum of private giving of the i-th gross inccme class devided
by the number of tax returns in the class. Hence for each of the
five years (1961, 65, 68, 71, 74) there are fourteen observations
of the endogeneous variable.
The value of the seemingly trivial concept of the price elasticity
of demand - obviously the theoretical core of all empirical studies
on tax subsidies to charity - has been thoroughly questioned by Hoch-
man & Rodgers (17, pp. 10 ff.). They argue that the concept is
entirely worthless as a guide to policy makers since it does not
yield any information on the amount of externalities to be interna-
lized via public subsidies to charity. Correct as Hochman & Rodgers
1
judgement may be in a world without prior public intervention where
government has first to solve the problem of finding an optimal trans-
fer level, it is certainly too destructive in a world where public
transfers already exist so that the prior transfer level, can be taken
as a starting-point for pare to improvements along, the lines described
above thereby assuming that both private and public redistribution are
backed up by externality arguments. In my view, this is the approach
adopted, albeit implicitly, by the above mentioned empirical studies.
2The term, "gross inccme" is used synonymously to the German legal term
"Gesamtbetrag der Einkiinfte".
See Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie L, Reihe 61: Einkcmmens- und
Korperschaftssteuer for 1961, 1965 and 1968; Statistisches Bundesamt,
Fachserie 14, Reihe 7.1.: Einkcmmenssteuer for 1971 and 1974._ Q _
3.2., Disposible Inccme (Y and YT) • .
Specifying an appropriate income variable is far more troublesome.
We need a comprehensive measure of the resources available to an
individual for personal consumption or saving in a given year of
taxation. Hence two basic questions stand out:
- What should be the gross income measure to arrive at the broadest
feasible concept of a personal budget? (i) :
- What should be the amount of taxes and other charges to be de-
ducted from gross inccme to arrive at an appropriate disposible
inccme measure? (ii).
(i) The use of an ideal permanent income measure is obvioulsy not
feasible in a world of'tax data exclusively limited to current
income concepts. As leldstein has aptly pointed out, there is
no bias from this specification error if the estimates are based
on grouped data of current income, with the grouping correctly
' classifying taxpayers according to their current and permanent
income . In the case of the grouped German income tax data,
this will most likely be a realistic assumption since the inter-
grouped variance of permanent income over the whole population
of taxpayers is certainly large relative to its intragroup
variance. Hence the bias should be negligably small. We are
left with the broad concept gross income (GI) defined as the
sum of all current income-streans from all possible sources,
and the narrow concept of taxable income (TI), loosely speaking
; defined as gross income minus the sum of all tax deductible
items like tax exemptions for children, voluntary church taxes
and compulsory property taxes, expenditure on vocational
2
training and tax consulting, charitable giving etc. . Which of
the two concepts is preferable for the purpose of computing the
income variable in our model has to be decided, on purely theo-
retical grounds. The choice crucially depends on the under-
standing of the term "disposable income": .
1Feldstein (9), p. 84.
2
Precise legal definitions of both concepts are to be found in Sta-
tistisches Bundesamt, op.cit. (1974) , p. 12.- 10 -
- If we consider all tax deductible items as burdens taking
away part of the taxpayer' s income without being part of
his consumption, we are bound to prefer the narrow concept
of taxable income with its restricted consumption choice set.
- If, in turn, we consider the factual conditions underlying
tax deductible items as the outcome of a voluntary, rational
consumption choice, we must resort to the broad budget con-
cept of gross inccme with all tax deductible items included.
I am strongly inclined to take the latter approach since in my
view, nearly all tax deductible items are in the domain of in-
dividual decisionmaking on lifetime allocation of permanent
income.•Nevertheless, as there might be arguments in favour
of either concept, the most important estimates of the empirical
part of the paper will be carried out for both income variables .
To avoid spurious interdependencies between exogenous and endo-
genous variables, taxable inccme must be adjusted by adding the
amount of deductible charitable giving. Of course, this need
not be done with gross incom;. which contains all tax deductible
items including charitable giving.
(ii) A measure of disposable income can be obtained by subtracting
the income tax liability (TL) from GI and (TI + C) respectively.
Three problems complicate the analysis:
- Once again, to avoid spurious interdependencies between exo-
genous and endogenous variables, we must not subtract the tax
actually paid but rather a "fictitious" tax that would have
been paid if the individual had not contributed to charity.
German tax law defines a third concept simply called "income" which
is somehow a midway between the polar concepts of gross income and
taxable income excluding "Sonderausgaben" (special expenses) but
including "AuBergewohnliche Belastungen" (extraordinary burden). As
no clearcut view on consumption underlies the concept of "income",
I have omitted it completely.- 11 -
- In the F.R.G. two distinct tax schedules are commonly used
to compute individual tax liabilities, namely the "basic
schedule", primarily applied to singles, and the "splitting
. schedule", exclusively applied to couples if they itemize
j r their income in one single tax return. As. the two schedules
mostly differ in average and marginal .tax rates at any given
taxable income, it is not possible to derive "fictituous"
tax liabilities frcm aggregate data of taxable incotie. .
Instead we must rescrt to tax liability data .
- Fran 1968 to 1974, the German income tax was. technically
supplemented by a tax surcharge ("Erganzungsabgabe").amounting
to 3.p.c. of the income tax liability for taxpayers with .
yearly gross income above 16 000 EM. Although legally sepa-
rated from the inccme tax, this compulsory surcharge may well
have figured as an effective rise of inccme tax liability in
the economic calculus of the individual taxpayer. To have a
check on the sensitivity of the parameter estimates with
respect to this redifinition of disposible inccme (and also
price of charity!), the main calculations were carried out
for both tax liability concepts, excluding and including the
tax surcharge.
To solve these problems simultaneously the following tedious com-
putation procedure was applied to each gross income class: The
average actual tax liability TL was computed from inccme tax lia-
bility statistics. TL is a mean of all taxpayers in the class,
regardless of how these individual tax liabilities have been can-
puted. The basic tax schedule renders the marginal tax rate (MTR)
at the actual tax liability TL corresponding to seme "fictituous."
taxable inccme Tip. To compute the amount of taxes saved through
charitable giving, the marginal tax rate was applied to the actual
amount of contributions. The saved amount, in turn, was added to
Of course/there is a more general argument in favour of using tax
•• liability instead of taxable income data:, if the degree of pro-
gression changes within a given income class,the average tax lia-
bility of the-class will reveal this fact while the tax liability
of the average taxable inccme will not.- 12 -
TL to arrive at the "fictituous" tax liability TLf reflecting both
the "splitting-effect" - via the actual tax liability - and the
"fiction effect" - via the added amount of charity induced tax
saving . TL,. is the appropriate variable to be subtracted frcm GI
and (TI + C) respectively.
In summary the whole procedure of canputing the disposible income
variable looks as follows:
1. step: computation of GI and (TI + C) respectively
2. step: computation of TL
3. step: computation of MTR at' TL (corresponding to Tip)
4. step: oatiputation of S = MTR • C '
5. step: computation of TLf = TL + S
6. step: computation of Y = GI - TL^ and
YT = (TI + C) - TLf respectively.
In the calculations with income tax surcharge SU, a fictituous
surcharge SUp was computed by multiplying SU by the ratio of
fictituous to actual tax liability. This procedure entails no
perceptible bias since the ratio of SU to TL is almost constant
over the relevant incane range. SUf was added to TLf, and the
sum of both replaced TLf in the formula of Y and YT. . .
3.3. Prjce of Charity (P)
With the previous discussion in mind the specification of an
appropriate price variable is fairly straightforward. Due to tax
deductability the price of private monetary transfers equals one
minus the marginal tax rate (p = 1-m).
As the price of charity enters the economic calculus of the ave-
rage taxpayer per gross income class at the level of the taxable
Due to the "discrete jumps" of tax liability in the tax schedule,
C could not just be added to TIf to read TLf off the tax sche-
dule. The direct application of the marginal tax rate to C prem-
ised more accuracy.Bibliothek det Institute
fQr Waltwfrtadiaft Kiel
- 13 -
income he would attain if he did not contribute to charity, the
marginal tax rate must be computed at the relevant fictituous
taxable incone (Tip. + C) . This procedure is invariant to the choice
of the exogenous income variable (Y or YT) in the econometric model
since the individual economic calculus does obviously not depend
on the broadness of the income concept.
To avoid some "technical" irregularities of the basic tax sche-
dule that defy any meaningful economic interpretation , the mar-
ginal tax rate for discrete changes of 600 EM in.the first ten-
gross income classes and 1 200 DM in the last four classes were
used to calculate the price variable. For very small taxable in-
ccmes falling below 600 DM, the remaining tax liability was also
devided by 600 resulting in correspondly lower marginal tax rates.
In the econometric model including the tax surcharge SU^, the
effect of the surcharge on the marginal tax rate was taken into
account by computing at (Tic + C) not the marginal change in TLp,
but the marginal change in (TL_ + SU^). As expected the tax sur-
charge slightly raised the marginal tax rate (i.d. lowered the
price of charity) for all taxpayers with yearly gross income above
16 000 DM. ' ' ,
Two statistical complications could not be accounted for:
- The German income tax law sets an upper limit to deductability
of charitable giving at 5 % of gross income, for giving to po-
litical parties even, an absolute ceiling of 1 800 DM. These
limitations do effectively raise the price of charity for tax-
payers approaching one of the ceilings. Fortunately, the average
So the marginal tax rate between two discrete current numbers
(60 DM) fluctuates between 16,67 % and 20 % in some ranges of~
the tax schedule in use for the years 1965 to 1974; the "average
marginal tax rate" (between ten current numbers in these ranges)
is constant at 19 '%. It would be absurd to interpret these kind
of irregularities - hardly noticed by any taxpayer - as genuine
realizations of the exogenous price variable in the econometric
model.- 14 -
ratio C/GI is extremely low in the F.R.G. (on average around
0,21 %, in the highest income class 0,57 %) so that the bias
from this source is presumably very small.
- According to § 10b income tax law, the value of charitable dona-
tions in kind is deductible fron taxable income . Thus realized
capital gains may escape the taxes that would be levied in case
of a sale of the asset in the current year. This in turn may
lower the opportunity cost of donations in kind thus leading to
a fall of the price of charity below the price of pure monetary
transfers. Unfortunately, the lack of data prohibits any attempt
of quantifying this effect in the case of Germany. It may be
comforting, however, that Feldstein's attempt to incorporate
a rudimentary measure of appreciated assets into his price




As noted above the German income tax statistics provide cross-:
section data for fourteen income classes and five years (1961,
65, 68, 71, 74) thus allowing the computation of 70 observations
of the three variables. In the subsequent time-series-cross-section
analysis, however, the observations of the first gross income class
(GI> 1 500 EM) will be omitted as the computation error is suspected
to be prohibitively high relativ to the negligibly low level of
private giving in this class. Both private giving and disposible
income are measured in constant 1970 DM by deflating with the
consumer price index.
§ 10b (2) German Incane Tax Law.
Feldstein (9), pp. 93 f. He also discusses the theoretical prob-
lem at length (9, p. 84 f.).- 15 -
3.5. Functional Form and Estimation Procedure
For the basic estimates a log-linear, constant elasticity speci-
fication of the form
(1) lnC = I3Q + 61 lnY + 62 inP + £ resp.
(2) lnC - 6Q + 61 lnYT + &2 lnP + £,
was chosen, with £ being a randan error term. In alternative
specifications the restrictive assuptions were relaxed to allow
for variable elasticities over some income ranges.
Equations (1) and (2) were first estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLSQ); a weighted least squares procedure (WLSQ) , des-
cribed in section 4, was later introduced to improve the effi-
ciency of the estimates.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Estimates with "Gross Disposible Income" (Y)
The basic ordinary least squares estimate of (1) is given in
2
table 1 as equation I. Despite the high adjusted R - not un-
usual in regressions with grouped data - the estimate suffers
from serious deficiencies: the test statistics indicate hetero-
scedasticity in both pooling characteristics (Gl-class and time),
intertemporal parameter changes and first order autocorrelation
with respect to income. Furthermore, the power of the insignificant
F-statistic on parameter constancy in class is strongly impaired
by the high level of heteroscedasticity in Gl-classes and time .
Heuristic examination of the residual structure indicated that
This is the well-known problem of testing hcmoscedasticity and
parameter constancy simultaneously; the use of either F-sta-
tistic (FS, FH) involves the implicit assumption that the non-
tested property of the regression holds. If it does not, the
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(A:/:, revlatlons, see appendix)- 17 -
taxpayers with nominal gross income below 16 000 DM (gross income
classes 2 to 6) should be omitted to improve the homogeneity of
the sample. This restriction does not seriously narrow the policy
scope of the predictions derived from the regression results since
only 3,49 % of total private giving in 1974 stemmed from these
lower classes.
Equation II shows the results for the restricted sample: while
probably homogeneous in class, the estimate is still^plagued by
heteroscedasticity and parameter changes in time.
Intertemporal parameter constancy can easily be established by
introducing an exponential time trend as is done in equation III.
Although quite satisfactory on statistical grounds, III suffers
from a theoretical drawback: the time trend cannot simply be
interpreted as the net effect of all non-specified variables mo-
ving in trend since the use of grouped data with nominal gross
income classes unchanged over time mostly eliminates any inter-
temporal increase of the income level itself. In the extreme, each
individual taxpayer may have experienced dramatic increases in in-
come while the average income of each class remains virtually
constant as the intra- and intergroup movement of the taxpayers
leaves the distribution in each class unchanged.
To account for this specific effect a variable for the income
level has to be introduced. Unfortunately, the average disposible
income of all sample tax returns will not do the job since its trend
itself is biased downward due to the disproportionally growing num-
ber of low income earners moving frcm the excluded gross income
classes (below 16 000 DM) into the included ones and, even more
importantly, frcm wage taxation - not included in the statistics -
into income taxation . Instead national income per employee (in
During the sample period, income taxation has been compulsory for
wage incomes above 24 000 DM for singles, 48 000 DM for couples
itemizing one single tax return. As these limits fall into the first
two sample classes whose share in the total number of income tax
returns has increased from 24,28 % in 1961 to 67,33 % in 1974, the
quantitative importance of the downward bias should be obvious.- 18 -
constant 1970 DM) appears to be a more reliable proxy for the
overall level of income (YL) at any given point in time.
As can be seen frcm the sum of squared residuals of equation IV
YL explains the" ihtertemporal shifts almost as well as the time
trend does ; the insignificant F-statistic on intertemporal para-
meter constancy suggests that there is no further need for re-
sorting to a "theoretically empty" time trend.
Equation IV will serve as a starting-point for further analysis.
It yields income and price elasticities in absolute amount sig-
nificantly greater than one thus indicating broad scope for a
liberalized tax treatment of charitable contributions. Due to seme
heteroscedasticity in time and class, equation IV is not yet the
most efficient of all linear unbiased estimates. To reduce the
variance to a global minimum an iterative weighted least squares
procedure (WLSQ)' was adopted. In a first step the absolute values
of the OLSQ-residuals of IV were regressed on all exogeneous
2
variables to identify the causes of the heteroscedasticity .
Drawing'on the estimated coefficients of this auxiliary regression
fitted residuals were computed and normalized; the reciprocals of
these fitted (and normalized) residuals were used as weights to
the original data. On basis of the weighted data a new regression
was run, and the whole procedure was repeated until no further
increase in efficiency could be achieved. In fact, two interations
were sufficient to eliminate all traces of heteroscedasticity.
Equation V presents the result of the WLSQ-procedure: while the
efficiency gain is remarkable - the sum of squared residuals is
On purely statistical grounds, of course, any other variable with
a pronounced trend component would do the job as well. On theo-
retical grounds, however, no other variable has a comparable de-
gree of a priori plausibility.
2
This procedure is known as the Glejser-test for heteroscedasti-
city. See Maddala (18), p. 262; Glejser (14).- 19 -
reduced fran 0.245 to 0.215 -, the test statistics identify an
intertemporal parameter change, particularly pronounced between
the periods 1961-65 and 1968-74. To check on the magnitude of
this parameter change which may be present but undetected due
to heteroscedasticity in III and IV as well, the equations were
reestimated for the homogeneous period beginning in 1968. These
estimates (equations VI and VII) yield higher absolute price
elasticities thus casting some doubt on the accuracy of the re-
latively low absolute price parameter of the WLSQ-equation .
To obtain seme more reliable information on the magnitude of the
coefficients the restrictive assumption of constant elasticities
over the income range has to be relaxed. Unfortunately, the high
collinearity between Y and P and the moderate sample size do not
allow any unconstrained parameter estimation for any distinct
gross inccme or price range. Similiarly, the conmon procedure of
specifying the variability of the elasticities by hypothesizing
elasticity changes, somehow functionally related to the level of
inccme and price is not applicable as, again, the high colline-
arity between Y and P at a moderate sample size prohibits the
2
introduction of any further collinear variable . Instead, we must
resort to the less elegant procedure of defining distinct price
and income variables for separate gross income ranges, namely YT
Li
and PT for Gl-classes of 16 000 - 100 000 EM and Yu and Pu for
GI-classes above 100 000 DM.
Equations X and XI, allowing for varying price elasticities at a
constant inccme elasticity, yield useful insights: the absolute
price elasticity turns out to be slightly (but not significantly)
. Estimates of the earlier period yield a. correspondingly lower
absolute price elasticity (around 1,30); as these estimates are
based on a very small sample (16 observations) , their value
should not be rated high.
vtfith the somewhat richer U.S. data, Feldstein (9, pp. 88 f.) is
able to specify a model along these lines; the variance of his
parameter estimates, however, is also pushed up by the high col-
linearity.- 20 -
higher in the lower than in the upper gross income ranges. If
we further relax the assumption of a constant income elasticity
as is done in XII and XIII, the gap widens, but the parameter
estimates loose a good deal of their statistical accuracy due
to the "separate" collinearity witin both ranges.
The results are in line with canmon prejudice asserting that
high income earners are less receptive to price incentives since
their charitable giving is primarily motivated by a price in-
elastic desire for social pcwer and prestige. As the parameter
shifts are hardly secured on statistical grounds, however, no
"far reaching conclusions can be drawn without additional evi-
dence fran same richer data source.
Incidentally, the slight parameter change may well explain the
relatively low absolute price elasticity indicated by the WLSQ-
equation V: as the estimation error in IV declines with the level
of income, the weighting procedure attaches greater weight to the
observations of the high income classes thus pulling down the
overall price elasticity toward sane lower absolute level. The
specifications with variable elasticities (X - XIII) clearly
point to a higher absolute price elasticity of the middle incane
classes somewhere between 1,60 and 1,80. This should be kept in
mind when resorting to the estimates to make predict ions of the
quantitative effects of various reform proposals .
Finally, the WLSQ procedure was applied to the sample of all
thirteen income classes. The results in VIII - for the full
sample - and IX - for 1968-1974 - show parameters not much diffe-
rent fran previous estimations using the restricted sample. As
the test statistics indicate distinct parameter changes in class
and time, the estimates should not be taken too seriously. The
specifications with variable elasticities (XIV, XV) between the
gross incane classes 1 500 - 16 000 DM and above 16 000 DM indi-
We will return to this issue in Section 5.-21 -
cate marked parameter changes at fairly large estimation errors;
no reliable conclusions can be drawn from these results.
Thw whole set of regressions in table 1 was reestimated for gross
disposible income and price variables including the impact of the
tax surcharge introduced in 1968 .
The main results are presented in table 2. As could be expected
the parameter estimates and the test statistics barely deviate
from previous results of corresponding specifications in table 1.
The only remarkable differences appear to be the slightly lower
absolute price elasticities and the slightly lower estimation
errors in almost all specifications: both facts are easily explained
by the increased price variation due to higher marginal tax rates
in the upper income classes.
On theoretical grounds the results of table 1 are somewhat in-
ferior to the results of table 2 as those are computed on a more
complete basis of all factors relevant to the economic calculus
of individual taxpayers.
4.2. Estimates with "taxable income" (YT)
An alternative set of specifications using taxable income YT in-
stead of gross income Y yield the results presented in table 3
(excluding the tax surcharge effects) and table 4 (including the
tax surcharge effects).
In general, the estimates have slightly inferior statistical
qualities compared to the estimates with the gross income vari-
able. While the income elasticities hardly change, the absolute
price elasticities are markedly reduced to levels around 1,3;
See pp. 12 ff. of this paper for the discussion of this spe-
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(Abbreviations, see appendix)- 25 -
in the WLSQ-equation II it is even pushed down to a level around
1,1. The variable elasticity specifications reveal the same pattern
as in tables 1 and 2, with the absolute price elasticity being
sonewhat lower in the high income ranges. The differences between
the corresponding equations of tables 3 and 4 are of a minor mag-
nitude.
The results show quite clarly that a change in the definition
of income may have substantial effects on the estimated parameters.
Hence a priori arguments favouring the broad or the narrow concept
of income cannot be neglected when making policy recommendations.
4.3. Comparison with Feldstein's Estimates
Table 5 contrasts the results with the main constant elasticity
estimates obtained by M. Feldstein in a time-series-cross-section
analysis of U.S. income tax data which methodologically comes
very close to the present study. The table reveals seme striking
features which will be sketched out briefly:
- The specification with gross disposible income indicates higher
absolute income and price elasticities for the case of Germany.
There is a plausible explanation for these peculiar differences:
About 65 % of all charitable giving in the U.S. is destined for
religious organizations; the corresponding ratio for the F.R.G.
is most probably far lower because, on behalf of the churches, the
government collects a so-called "church tax" fran church members.
2
As Feldstein has shown for the U.S. , lower income earners con-
centrate their giving almost exclusively on religious organizations,
whereas high income earners prefer giving to other charitable pur-
puses like higher education, research, health services etc.; thus
religious giving figures as a kind of income- and price inelastic
base which is obviously present in the U.S. , but lacking in the
Unfortunately, no disaggregated data on this issue is published
in Germany.
2See Feldstein (10), p. 213 (table 1).
Feldstein
1s elasticity estimates for various kinds of charitable























































































































(Abbreviations, see appendix)- 27 -
F.R.G. The validity of this explanation seems to be strengthend
by the fact that the ratio of average German to average American
charitable giving at equal income levels rises fran 1/27th for
taxpayers with net income of about 18 000 DM (1968) to 1/7th for
inccme levels about 200 000 DM (1968). Hence it is not surprising
that the German regression curve turns out to be somewhat steeper
than the American one.
- In both studies taxable income has a lower explanatory power than
gross disposible income. In the case of the U.S., the results for
taxable income cast serious doubt on the validity of the spe-
cification: the extraordinary low income elasticity, the extremely
high absolute price elasticity and, most of all, the high standard
error of the regression are apparently no good basis for any
comparison with the results for Germany.
- Feldstein's estimates indicate a negative time trend which -
he argues - may be due to a decline of the relative inccme of
the. taxpayers in the restricted sample . To me, the negative
sign remains an unexplained puzzle since precisely the grouping
and averaging of the data should tend to "neutralize" any ab-
solute change in disposible inccme. If at all, a positive time
trend should emerge .
- Finally, Feldstein
1 s estimates yield a constant term clearly above
the one estimated for Germany. This fact can mostly be explained
by differing average propensities to spend on charity independent
of inccme and price: in the U.S., the ratio of contributions to dis-
posible income varies between 25,9 % (!) in the highest Gl-class
down to 2,8 % in seme middle income ranges whereas in Germany it
never surpasses 1,1 %. Due to seme non-specified socioeconomic or
political reasons, the Americans are far more generous than the
Germans.
Veldstein (9), p. 88, footnote 27.
2
See the argument outlined in part 4.1. of this paper. Abrams &
Schmitz (1) believe that an increase in public welfare expenditure
has caused this downward trend in private giving.
3Feldstein (9), p. 87, table 1.- 28 -
5. Proposals for Reform
Almost all price elasticities estimated in Section IV indicate
broad scope for efficiency gains through a more liberal income
tax treatment of charitable giving in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
To forecast the quantitative effects of various reform schemes
we must take one of the specifications in table 2 and 4 as the
basis for predictions. Although the WLSQ-equation II may have
the most attractive statistical properties, it will not be chosen
as it probably underestimates the price elasticity in the impor-
tant middle income ranges (16 000 EM - 100 000 EM) which, in 1974,
included 96,28 % of all tax returns in the sample. On these grounds
the simple OLSQ-equation I is clearly preferable; as its restric-
tive constant elasticity assumption is not falsified by the
homogenous sample estimates of equations III and IV or the
variable elasticity specifications of equations VII to X, there
is no reason to be particularly sceptical about the accuracy of
the estimate.
On the basis of equations I in table 2 and 4, ex-post predictions
for 1974 are made by retaining the 1974 observations of YL and Y
resp. YT but replacing the factual values of P by the designed
reform prices.
Two basic ways of subsidizing charity must be considered, namely
the tax deduction and the tax credit.
- In a system of tax deductions, the taxpayer is allowed to re-
duce his taxable income by the amount of his charitable giving.
Thus his per unit tax saving is a positive function of the
marginal tax rate he faces. Hence, in a progressive income tax
scheme, the subsidy per unit of giving rises with income.- 29 -
- In a system of flat-rate tax credits, the taxpayer is allowed to
reduce his tax liability by a fixed percentage of his charitable
giving. Hence his tax saving is .independent of the income tax
scheme provided that his tax liability is not yet close to zero
which is the unusual limiting case .
As the present German system is a pure deduction scheme with the
price of private monetary transfers just equaling one minus the
marginal tax rate, there are two distinct changes any reform may
bring about, namely .
- a replacement of the tax deduction by a tax credit yielding the
same anount of gross charitable giving, and
- a genuine liberalization by increasing subsidies to charitable
giving either in a tax deduction or in a tax credit franework.
Both aspects are analyzed in tables. 6 and 7:
- Colunns 1 and 2 put the present deduction system against a tax
credit scheme yielding an equal anount of gross giving (about
660 Mio EM in current 1 974 prices) by fixing the per unit tax
subsidy at 0.3784 (in table 6) and 0.3683 (in table 7) . The
structural differences deserve sane comments: only the lowest
two income classes enjoy a higher subsidy rate in the tax credit
system but as they alone account for 82,38 % of all tax returns
in the sample the quantitative impact of the subsidy shift is
tremendous. As can be seen from the lower bounds of the pre-
diction intervalls, the increase of private giving in the lower
income ranges is well secured on statistical grounds, with the
possible exception of the first Gl-class in the eiasticity-
pessimistic prediction of table 7. The social gain as defined
2
in Section 2 of the current tax deduction system is slightly
1 • A third way of subsidizing charity is the flat-rate matching grant:
in this system a fixed proportion of the taxpayer's charitable giving
is added to the donation. As long as an increase in the recipient's
welfare is the prevalent charity motive, the economic effects of the
matching grant are analogous to the effects of a flat-rate tax credit.
2
See pp. 6 f.- 3O -
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(Abbreviations, see appendix)- 32 -
lover than the social gain of the equal revenue tax credit
system which indicates sane shift fran intramarginal to mar-
ginal subsidization.
- Columns 3 and 4 put the quantitative effects of a 50 %-increase
of subsidy rates in the present deduction system against the
effects of a tax credit with the same average per unit subsidy
of 0.6649 for all taxpayers. Both reform schemes induce remark-
able increases in gross giving and social gain, but once again,
the tax credit wins the race on quantitative efficiency grounds,
, independently of the prediction equation used. Again, the sta-
tistical properties of the forecasts are quite satisfactory. It
should be kept in mind, however, that the absolute price elas-
ticity estimate for the upper classes may well entail an upward
bias; as the tax deduction scheme relies more heavily on the
quantitative increase of private giving in these classes, the
efficiency gap between the two schemes may even be larger than
indicated.
- Column 5 shows the forecast for a generous reform introducing a
flat-rate per unit tax credit of 0.8. The wide gap between the
"optimistic" predictions of table 6 and the "pessimistic" pre-
dictions of table 7 is particularly striking for this dramatic
subsidy increase. In both cases, however, the induced increases
in gross giving and social gain are remarkable. Although the
forecast may be biased due to neglected income effects occuring
through the drastic change in the price of charity, the overall
magnitude of the predicted level of private giving is certainly
no statistical illusion. Before dismissing such generous proposals
for reform as utterly unrealistic, we should recognize that the
 T
ratio of charitable giving to disposable income - in this reform
scheme in the range of 1,33 % to 3,78 % for the elasticity opti-
mistic predictions of table 6 - would merely be approaching
American dimensions frcm below.
 :
Strictly speaking, the new scheme is not a deduction system any-
more since the marginal tax rate does no more equal the per unit
subsidy rate. To avoid semantic confusion, we retain the previous
terminology throughout the paper.- 33 -
In summary we can conclude that there is in fact a very broad
scope for liberalizing the tax treatment of charitable contribu-
tions. On purely quantitative efficiency grounds, this scope could
best be exploited if the present tax deduction scheme were re-
placed by a flat-rate-tax-credit which allowed the state to tap
the broad giving potential of the middle classes .
6. Final Remarks
The econometric model developed in this paper shows quite clearly
what kind of information can be drawn from German income tax sta-
tistics. The estimates of income and price elasticities are fairly
reliable on statistical grounds and the policy conclusions derived
fran these estimates are firmly rooted in standard microeconanic
theory.
Nevertheless the limitations of an analysis based on a single set
of data should not be overlooked: no doubt, it would be desirable
to check on the magnitude of the coefficients by using seme en-
tirely independent data sources as has been done for the U.S. by
Feldstein & associates (3, 11, 12) and Clotfelter (7).
Unfortunately, this way of corroborating the results does not seem
to be feasible for Germany since there has never been a "national
survey of philanthropy". The regionally disaggregated tax data for
the German states may be a precious source for estimating the impact
of other variables on charitable giving; they are, however, of
little help for checking on the parameter estimates in this paper.
This is not to say that other externality arguments may not point
in different directions. In my view, however, a thorough welfare
theoretic analysis will support the superiority of the tax credit
system (see Hochman & Fodgers (17, pp. 7 ff.), Paque (19, pp.
22 ff.)).- 34 -
Appendix
jfcbreviations in tables 1-5:
OLSQ = ordinary least squares;
WLSQ = weighted least squares (weighting procedure
described in section 4);
n = total number of observations in the sample;
Cl. = Gl-classes in the sample;
T = years in the sample; .
const. = parameter estimate of constant, resp. weighted
constant in log-linear specifications;
Y,YT,P/YL,YL,YH,YTL YTH = parameter-estimates - standard estimation ' error in paranthesis - of Y,YT etc. (as de-
fined in section 3 and 4) in log-linear
specification;
Time . = parameter estimate of exponential time trend;
o
ad R - adjusted square of multiple regression co-
efficient (only given for OLSQ-estimates);
SSR - sim of squared residuals;
SE -• standard error of the regression;
E3WL, = Durbin-Watson-statistic for the estimate
with observations ordered according to the
magnitude of the income variable (Y resp.
YT) in the equation;
FHa = F-statistic of hanoscedasticity according to
pH ' Goldfeld & Quandt (14): the sample is devided
T1 into two distinct ranges of the grouping
characteristics (classes: 7-10 and 11-14 for
n = 40, 2-6 and 7-14 for n = 65; time 1961-
1965 and 1968-1974); the F-statistic is given
as the ratio of the SSR - corrected for the
corresponding ratio of degrees of freedom -
of the seperate estimates for the two ranges;
FS™ . = F-statistic of parameter constancy as des-
j
1 cribed by Maddala (17, pp. 198 ff.): the
sample is splitted into two or more distinct
ranges of the grouping characteristics (classes:
7-10 and 11-14 for n = 40, 2-6 and 7-14 for
n - 65; time (T-i): 1961-65 and 1968-74;
time (T2): 1961,65,68,71 and 74); for these
ranges seperate regressions are run and the
SSR of these unrestricted estimates are
summed up; the F-statistic is obtained by
computing the difference of the restricted
estimates' SSRs and the summed unrestricted
estimates' SSRs as a fraction of the unre-
stricted estimates' SSRs, both numerator and
denominator corrected for the relevant degrees
of freedom;- 35 -
significance levels
- of the F- and DW-statistics:
* = significant at the 5 % level;
** = significant at the 1 % level;
++ = DW-statistic in the indifference range at the 1•% and the
5 % level;
*+• = DW-statistic in the indifference range at the 1 %. level,
but significant at the 5 % level;
- of the parameter estimates:
all significant at least at the 1 % level if not denoted by "o"
(= not significant); . .
explanation of tables 6 and 7
row 1 (Cj): charitable giving per average tax return in class i
- column 1: factual values;
- column 2-5: point forecasts and prediction intervals for
various prices of charity (10 %-significance-interval as .
only lower prediction bound, i.d. one-sided test at 5 %-
significance level is policy relevant);
row 2 (JC|): sum of all gross charitable giving in Gl-class i;
row 3 (2C^(1-Pi)) : sum of all subsidies in Gl-class i;
row 4 (^Cj^pj^): social gain per Gl-class i, defined as sum of all
charitables giving minus sum of all subsidies in Gl-class i.- 36 -
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